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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
The parties are: (a)Donald Rawlings ("Donald") and his spouse Jeanette Rawlings 
("Jeanette"); (b) Arnold Dwayne Rawlings ("Dwayne") and his spouse Paulette 
Rawlings ("Paulette"), individually and as Trustees of the Arnold Dwayne Rawlings 
Family Trust; and (c) Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. Rawlings ("Bryce") 
and Carol Lynn R. Masterson ("Carol"). Donald, Dwyane, LaRell, Bruce and Carol aife 
siblings and their parents are Arnold J. Rawlings ("Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings ("Cleo"). 
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Court of Appeals5 Opinion 
The Court of Appeals' opinion is set forth as: Rowlings v. Rowlings, 2008 UT App 
478 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
Date of Entry of Decision 
The Court of Appeals' decision was issued on December 26, 2008. 
Statutory Jurisdictional Provision 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a 
constructive trust. 
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for 
correctness. 'The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that 
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of 
review.'" State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah 2002). 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules, and Regulations 
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal issues 
present in this matter. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The court is being asked to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which 
reversed the District Court's decision imposing a constructive trust on property described 
in a deed dated signed by Arnold J. Rawlings and Cleo Rawlings dated March 24, 1967, 
listing Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings as grantees. Arnold was the sole owner of 
the property and intended only to make a temporary transfer, with Arnold's remaining 
children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the trust property. (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact | 57). The issue is whether the March 24, 
1967 deed would allow the district court to properly impose a constructive trust as an 
equitable remedy pursuant to Utah case law, Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 or 
Restatement of Restitution §160. 
Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts 
The case was tried to the bench trial, where the trial court ruled in favor of 
Dwayne, LaRell, Bryce, and Carol, imposing a constructive trust on the property 
conveyed to Donald and Jeanette in the 1967 and 1974 deeds. 
Donald and Jeanette appealed to the Utah Supreme Court and the case was poured 
over to the Court of Appeals. The matter was argued before the Court of Appeals on 
August 21, 2008. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on December 26, 2008, 
reversing the District Court's judgment finding that a constructive trust was established, 
and reversing the District Court's order awarding sanctions against Donald and Jeanette 
for failing to engage in good faith participation in Court ordered mediation. Dwayne and 
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Paulette now ask this Court to correct the Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling on the 
reversal of the imposition of a constructive trust. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Arnold J. Rawlings (Arnold) and Cleo Rawlings (Cleo) had five children who are, 
in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (Donald), Arnold Dwayne Rawlings (Dwayne), 
Theron LaRell Rawlings (LaRell), Bryce C. Rawlings (Bryce), and Carol Rawlings 
Masterson (Carol). (Findings of Fact f 1). In 1944, Arnold purchased property from his 
mother, Gertrude Rawlings, and obtained the deed to the property (the "trust property"). 
(R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 31:19-25). Cleo has never had title in the trust property. (Findings 
of Fact f 2). Arnold sold 12 acres of his approximately 22.37 acres of the trust property, 
leaving approximately 10.37 acres. (Findings of Fact f3). Thereafter, Arnold and his 
family used the trust property to grow and sell produce; Arnold also kept on the trust 
property the horses he and his family broke. (R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 39:7-18). 
In 1962, Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne 
and spouse on which they built a home. (Findings of Fact [^4). In 1967 a very small piece 
was deeded to Dwayne and spouse by Arnold between the properties where Arnold's 
home was and where Dwayne and spouse built their home. Id. In 1960, Arnold deeded to 
Donald and spouse a property slightly to the west of the property deeded to Dwayne. Id. 
Donald built his home on that property. Id. In 1964, Arnold deeded in 1964 property to 
Donald adjacent to Donald's home which has been referred to as the barn property. Id. In 
1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of Dwayne's home 
("the garden") and the other south of the bam property ("the orchard"). Id. 
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In 1963, Arnold's remaining interest in the property ("the trust property") was 
pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed (Findings of Fact |^ 5, Trial 
Exhibit 8). In 1964, that indebtedness was rewritten as a conditional sales contract with 
the pledge of a Ford truck and an Oldsmobile automobile. (Findings of Fact f 6). The 
transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security. 
(Findings of Fact f 7). 
By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately 
required medical attention. (Findings of Fact f 8). Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald 
talked to the Utah County Department of Public Welfare (Welfare Department) about his 
intention to have his father transfer the trust property to him. (Findings of Fact f 9). That 
intent was corroborated by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a 
prior meeting, and providing proof of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of 
the Walker Bank debt. (Findings of Fact If 9, Trial Exhibit 86). On December 22, 1966, 
Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which he labored 
to recover from his illness. (Findings of Fact If 10). In January of 1967, Arnold began the 
series of 20 cobalt treatments. (Findings of Fact f 11). The medical attention that Arnold 
required was extremely expensive. Id. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the medical 
treatment and received welfare assistance. Id. Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and 
he was in very poor health in 1966 and 1967. (Findings of Fact f 16; R. 1588 Trans. Vol. 
II, 244:15-19, R. 1590 Trans. Vol. IV, 629:17-22, 632:14-15.) In March of 1967, Arnold 
was somewhat advanced in age, had an eighth grade or less education, and was very 
concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare Department. (Findings of 
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Fact If 16; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 48:21-24, 132:17-19,225:11-20). The Welfare 
Department would pay the majority of the medical expenses associated with Arnold's 
illness if Arnold's property (other than his home) was not in his name. (Findings of Fact ^ 
14). He was advised by the Welfare Department to transfer the trust property out of his 
name. (Trial Exhibit 68). Arnold told LaRell that Arnold needed to get the trust property 
out of his name and suggested that he deed it to LaRell. (Findings of Fact ^[43, R. 1587 
Trans. Vol. I, 48:13-19). LaRell testified that he didn't want the responsibility and 
suggested that Arnold put the land in Dwayne's name because Dwayne would be the 
most fair to the family. (Findings of Fact [^44, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. 149:8-11). Arnold 
indicated to LaRell that he thought LaRell's suggestion to put the land in Dwayne's name 
was a good idea. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. 149:11-12). 
However, Arnold later requested a meeting at a restaurant in Salt Lake with 
Donald and LaRell. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I. 49:13-23). LaRell testified that Arnold met 
him in the parking lot of the restaurant and informed him that "Donald's really upset" 
"because he's the oldest, and he thinks [the trust property] should be put in his name." (R. 
1587 Trans. Vol. I 49:24-25, 50:1-3). LaRell testified that Arnold then stated to LaRell 
that putting the land in Donald's name was the "same deal" as when they had discussed 
putting the land in Dwayne's name. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 50:5-10). LaRell understood 
from Arnold that Arnold thought the trust property would come back to him when he got 
better, and, if Arnold didn't recover, then it would first go to take care of Cleo and then to 
the rest of the family. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 50:14-18). At the meeting between Donald, 
Arnold, and LaRell, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald 
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because of the Welfare requirement for receiving assistance—Arnold did not mention the 
Walker Bank debt as a reason for deeding the trust property to Donald. (Findings of Fact 
fflf 45, 46, 47; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 51:1-3). 
In January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on 
the trust property; Dwayne borrowed $1,000 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and 
endorsed that check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which 
Donald alleged were due on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 50). Donald did not 
deliver this $1000 to the Utah County Assessor for payment of real estate taxes until after 
the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold. Id. One or two days before 
March 24, 1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald and Arnold met with 
Dwayne, and Arnold informed Dwayne that Arnold was deeding the trust property to 
Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consistent with 
other concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer 
had anything to do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt. (Findings of 
Fact f48). On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused a total of $1,267 ($1,000 of 
which was paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust 
property and on properties owned by Donald and spouse. (Findings of Fact f 52). 
Dwayne testified that during a conversation with Donald present, Arnold disclosed that 
he was putting the trust property in Donald's name to be held for the family and divided 
later. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 336:1-2, 381: 8-15). 
Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder 
on March 24, 1967, Arnold deeded the trust property to Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of 
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Fact f 17, Trial Exhibit 12). Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal 
description. Id. Although Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership 
interest in the trust property, and there was no testimony given as to why she executed 
any deed that was offered into evidence in this manner. Id. The same day, a quit-claim 
deed ("the sibling deed") was signed by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, 
and Bryce in favor of Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of Fact f 19). Bryce testified that he 
was told by Arnold before he signed the deed that the welfare treatments were the reason 
the trust property needed to be transferred, and that the transfer was temporary—meaning 
that the trust property would be returned to Arnold when Arnold got better. (R. 1588 
Trans. Vol. II 225:11-20,245:21-25). LaRell testified that when he went to sign the deed, 
Arnold explicitly told him (without prompting) that the trust property was not Donald's; 
it was the family's property. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 60:9-12, Findings of Fact J^ 53). 
Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of Carol, 
Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject. (Findings of Fact f 54). 
After the deeds were signed in March 1967, Arnold's routine in running the 
farming and livestock operations on the trust property remained the same. (R. 1587 
Trans. Vol. I 63:19-23; R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 229:23-25; 281:11-21). Bryce testified that 
his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald and spouse intending only to make 
it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the 
trust property. (Findings of Fact % 57). Arnold continued to refer to the trust property as 
"his," and he considered the trust property to be his up until the time of his death. 
(Findings of Fact % 56, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 233:24-25; 234:1; 253:1-22; 339:16-22). 
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After the signing of the deed, Arnold gave permission to Bryce to live on the trust 
property and picked a spot for him to put his mobile home. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 
235:18-21). In 1970, Arnold requested that the military discharge his son LaRell early so 
that he could come help Arnold on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f^ 58). Several 
letters addressed to the military from Arnold and various other individuals in the 
community referred the trust property as Arnold's farm, with no mention of Donald 
owning the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 58, Trial Exhibits 19-29). 
On March 1,1971, Arnold died. (Findings of Fact |65). On March 30, 1971, 
Arnold's widow paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which included all of the trust property. 
(Findings of Fact | 67). After Arnold's death, most of the family members except Donald 
continued to work on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f20, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 
66:3-8); R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 254:8-10). When asked about who worked on the trust 
property, Donald testified, "all I (Donald) know is that I didn't." (Findings of Fact f 20, 
75). 
After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the 
income from the trust property was being used to support their widowed mother. 
(Findings of Fact f 22, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 238:11-12). In 1974, the Vineyard 
Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south boundary line of the trust 
property (see Trial Exhibit 1). (Findings of Fact f 24, 70, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 401:1-
2). As it was developed, fences were place in the backyards of the homes in Vineyard 
meadows Subdivision, generally near the south boundary line of the trust property. 
Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon "Mother's 
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farm." Id. At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/' 
Dwayne and his son worked with Donald and his son to place a fence through the 
backyards of the home owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for 
"Mother's farm" was. Id. Dwayne regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saint ward with the people who lived in those homes. Id. He and his spouse were 
friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed testimony is, in order to 
assist in the protection of the trust property, Dwayne and his son placed fencing in those 
yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was resolved. Donald 
caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings (LaRell 
refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. Id. This included 
the purchase of a car. Id. As part of the Vineyard Meadows lawsuit, Donald persuaded 
his siblings to sign a deed naming Donald and Jeanette as grantees, which Donald 
explained contained a legal description only of the disputed area. (Findings of Fact 125, 
72, Trial Exhibit 30, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 104:1-4). In fact, it contained a legal 
description that included all of the trust property. (Findings of Fact f25, Trial Exhibit 30). 
The Vineyard Meadows lawsuit was settled, and Donald gave some of the funds to his 
siblings and used some to support his mother. (Findings of Fact f 24, 71). Donald then 
co-mingled the remainder of the settlement money with his own money, along with the 
trust property proceeds not used for his mother. (Finding of Fact f 76, R. 1589 Trans. 
Vol. Ill, 579:2-24). The testimony is undisputed that Donald is unable to distinguish any 
funds which he spend at any time from March 24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their 
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source whether they came from the trust property incomfe or from income from some 
other source. (Findings of Fact % 76). 
Until 1993, less than four (4) years before this suit was filed, the family members 
believed that the trust property was held for the family and that Donald considered it to 
be the trust property until a conversation in which Donald told Dwayne that the land was 
his (Donald's) property and that he wasn't compensating their mother for anything he 
used from the property. (Findings of Fact f 74, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 3556:12-20). 
Donald and Jeanette maintain that they were deeded the trust property by Arnold 
because they paid an alleged indebtedness for him. (Findings of Fact | 39-40). Donald 
and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to the Walker Bank on December 29, 1966 to 
pay off Arnold's indebtedness and save the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 27). The 
conditional contract which Donald and Jeanette assert they paid off was marked paid on 
December 15, 1966 and altered by ink to show a date of December 29, 1966. (Findings of 
Fact f 28-29). As set forth above, Arnold's surgery was on December 22,1966. The bank 
had a security interest in a Ford truck and Oldsmobile which could have been foreclosed 
and taken in satisfaction of remaining debt. (Findings of Fact f 31). If a foreclosure of the 
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 
90 days for the debtors to cure the default before Notice of Sale could have been 
published. Id. No such recording was every produced and is not a record in the Utah 
County Recorder's Office. Id. No evidence was presented that the check for $579.06 was 
the required loan payoff amount. (Findings of Fact 132). Jeanette testified that she and 
Donald had their own indebtedness with Walker Bank and Trust Company for the 
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building of their home at the same time period. (Findings of Fact f 33). Donald and 
Jeanette's banking records offered into evidence during the trial revealed no other 
payments to Walker Bank during the time frame, in spite of Jeanette's uncontroverted 
testimony that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been 
made with Walker Bank and Trust during that time frame. (Findings of Fact f^ 35). The 
deeding of the trust property to Donald and Jeanette occurred on March 24, 1967—some 
three months after the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. (Findings 
of Fact f 37). After the litigation commenced, Jeanette altered the checks evidencing 
payments to Walker Bank and Trust Company by adding language on each of them to 
indicate they were paid to Walker Bank and Trust Company for and in behalf of Arnold 
Rawlings. (Findings of Fact f^ 38). It was only during the May 9,2005, deposition of 
Jeanette that she admitted to the alteration of the documentary evidence, by notations 
made after this suit was filed, for the purpose of designating those checks as checks paid 
on Arnold Rawlings' account. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court should hold the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's 
imposition of a constructive trust because the district court could properly impose a 
constructive trust under either Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 or Restatement of 
Restitution §160. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allows for the imposition of a constructive 
trust for a third party if the grantor and grantee were in a confidential relationship at the 
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time of the transaction and the grantor did not intend to transfer both legal and equitable 
title to the grantee. Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable title as required 
by Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. The transferor need not extract a promise from 
the transferee to hold the property in trust in order for the court to properly find that the 
property was transferred with the intent to create a trust. In determining whether or not to 
institute a constructive trust, the court should look at the situation sensibly and broadly 
with all human implications. As a result, although no evidence was presented that Donald 
entered into an express promise to hold the property in trust for Arnold, the court may 
still properly impose a constructive trust. 
Individual findings of fact by the district court should not be taken out of context 
but should be viewed in context with the case as a whole. The Court of Appeals 
erroneously took paragraph 62 of the District Court's findings of fact out of context and 
interpreting, "Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership 
rights in the [trust property]" to mean that Arnold did not intend to transfer the property 
at all. However, when taken in context with the rest of the findings of fact, the statement 
simply means that Arnold intended to transfer legal, but not equitable, title to the property 
and did not intend to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of the trust property in their 
personal capacities. 
Arnold was in a confidential relationship with Donald at the time that Arnold 
transferred legal title of the trust property into Donald's name. A formal confidential 
relationship need not exist between the transferor and transferee; the superiority of one 
party and dependence, trust and reliance of the other are the important factors. Although a 
12 
parent-child relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential relationship, a 
family relationship characterized such that the transferor is justified in believing that the 
transferee will act in his interest is enough to create a confidential relationship which will 
satisfy the requirement of Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. The transferee does not 
have to be guilty of undue influence, intentional fraud or other abuse of his confidential 
relationship with the transferor for a constructive trust to be imposed. When the 
constructive trust was created, Arnold was sick and mentally distressed at the thought of 
losing the trust property, there was a great age disparity between Arnold and Donald as 
well as a parent/child relationship. Arnold was justified in believing that Donald would 
act in Arnold's best interests in his actions regarding the 1967 conveyance. According to 
Utah law they were in a confidential relationship. Even if Donald was not guilty of undue 
influence in getting Arnold to transfer title of the land to him, the court could still 
properly impose a constructive trust because of the confidential relationship that existed 
between Arnold and Donald. Because Arnold had the necessary intent to split the legal 
and equitable title to his property when he conveyed the land to Donald in 1967 and 
Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance, this 
Court should find that the Court of Appeals' reversal of the constructive trust imposed by 
the district court was improper under Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45. 
Restatement of Restitution §160 
This court should uphold the District Court's imposition of a constructive trust on 
the trust property because Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to 
retain the title of the property without the imposition of a constructive trust. The 
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Restatement of Restitution §160 declares that a constructive trust arises if the person 
holding the title to the property would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain 
it. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, and the court 
has broad discretion in how it applies this remedy; the court is "bound by no unyielding 
formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction 
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust 
enrichment." A constructive trust, unlike other types of trusts, does not require a 
manifestation of intent to create a trust and may be imposed by law regardless of the 
intention of the parties or legal title. When determining whether a constructive trust is the 
proper equitable remedy, the totality of circumstances and setting will be taken into 
account. 
Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to retain the 
title to the trust property because the trust property's success over the years has been a 
product of the family effort where everyone except Donald has worked on the trust 
property to keep it running and maintain the land. Even if the court does not think that 
Arnold had the necessary intent to satisfy Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45, the court 
can still impose a constructive trust under Restatement of Restitution §160 to prevent 
unjust enrichment. Since the constructive trust was proper under either or both of these 
theories, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a 
constructive trust. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District 
Court's imposition of a constructive trust because Utah law supports the 
imposition of a constructive trust in this case under either the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts §45 or the Restatement of Restitution §160-
This Court should hold that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district 
court's imposition of a constructive trust on the trust property to which Donald holds the 
title. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts allows for the imposition of a constructive trust 
for a third party if the grantor and grantee were in a confidential relationship at the time 
of the transaction. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45. Since Donald and Arnold were in 
a confidential relationship when the 1967conveyance occurred, the district court's 
imposition of the constructive trust was proper under § 45 of the Restatement of Trusts. 
In addition, the Restatement of Restitution §160 instructs the court to impose a 
constructive trust whenever a party would be unjustly enriched by retaining property to 
which he has legal title. Donald would be unjustly enriched by retaining the title to the 
trust property without a constructive trust. Under either the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts or the Restatement of Restitution, the district court's decision to impose a 
constructive trust was correct. 
A. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the imposition of a constructive trust on the 
trust property under Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 because Arnold, the 
transferor, had both the intent to split the legal and equitable title and a 
confidential relationship with Donald, the transferee. 
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Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which this Court has applied in 
previous constructive trust cases, the district court correctly imposed a constructive trust 
on the trust property. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1) reads as follows: 
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another in 
trust for a third person, but no memorandum property evidencing the 
intention to create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, 
and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the 
interest upon a constructive trust for the third person, if, but only if 
a) The transferee by fraud, duress or undue influence prevented the 
transferor from creating an enforceable interest in the third person, or 
b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to 
the transferor, or 
c) The transfer was made by the transferor in anticipation of death. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1). 
No writing evidenced Arnold's intent to transfer title to Donald and Jeanette in 
trust. The evidence does show that Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable 
title to the trast property and that Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at 
the time of the transfer. Therefore, the imposition of a constructive trust by the district 
court was proper. 
i. Arnold had the intent to split the legal and equitable title as required by Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts §45. 
Arnold intended to split legal and equitable title when he made the 1967 
conveyance of property to Donald and Jeanette. The transferor need not extract a promise 
from the transferee to hold the property in trust in order for the court to properly find that 
the property was transferred with the intent to create a trust. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 
229, 232 (Utah 1949); Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255, 258; Wood v. 
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Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91,118 N. E. 214. In Haws v. Jensen, the Utah 
Supreme Court was examining an argument made by the defendant that the constructive 
trust imposed by the lower court was inappropriate because the plaintiffs complaint had 
not contained an allegation "that the grantee made a promise to the grantor to hold the 
property in trust as a condition of the conveyance of the property to [the grantee]." 209 
P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1949). To support its imposition of a constructive trust, the Utah 
Supreme Court cited a New York case where a constructive trust was found despite the 
absence of an express promise to hold the property in trust for the grantor: 
In Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255, 258, the grantor, a court 
clerk, owned an interest in certain real property. His ownership subjected 
him to constant importunities to go bail for persons in trouble. In order to 
escape these importunities, he executed a deed conveying his interest in the 
property to his sister. After his death litigation arose as to whether the 
conveyance had been made in trust for him. Said the New York Court of 
Appeals, speaking through Justice Cardozo, "Even if we were to accept her 
[the sister's] statement that there was no distinct promise to hold it for his 
[the grantor's] benefit, the exaction of such a promise, in view of the 
relation, might well have seemed to be superfluous. Though a promise in 
words was lacking, the whole transaction, it might be found, was 'instinct 
with an obligation' imperfectly expressed. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 91, 118 N. E. 214. It was to be interpreted, not 
literally or irrespective of its setting, but sensibly and broadly with all 
human implications." 
Id 
Like the Haws and Sinclair cases, no evidence in this case shows that Arnold 
obtained an express promise from Donald that Donald would hold the property in trust 
for his father instead of claiming the property for himself. However, as Justice Cardozo 
stated, the transaction should be looked at "sensibly and broadly with all human 
implications." Because of the nature of the relationship between the grantor and the 
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grantee in this case—a sick, aging, and under-educated father and his healthy oldest 
son—Arnold likely felt that the extraction of an express promise was unnecessary. 
Arnold had expressed to multiple parties that the sole purpose of transferring the legal 
title in the trust property to Donald and Jeanette was to retain County welfare payment of 
medical expenses. In addition, because Arnold had previously discussed deeding title to 
the trust property to both LaRell and Dwayne before deciding to transfer title to Donald, 
Donald did not reasonably believe that the transfer was a gift making him and Jeanette 
the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities with no obligation to hold it in 
trust for Arnold. 
In addition, individual findings of fact by the district court should not be taken out 
of context but should be viewed in context with the case as a whole. Salt Lake City S. 
R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm % 1999 UT 90, P7 (Utah 1999); Schmidt v. Utah State Tax 
Comm % 1999 UT 48, P7 (Utah 1999); Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 
2003); Roadmaster (USA) Corp. v. Calmodal Freight Sys., 153 Fed. Appx. 827, 829 (3d 
Cir. N.J. 2005); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 
976 F.2d 1559, 1567-1568 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In Covey v. Covey, a brother appealed a 
judgment in a suit brought against him by his sister for a breach of contract. Covey 80 
P.3d at 555. The brother challenged the validity and consistency of three findings of fact 
by the lower court. Id. The Court affirmed the consistency of the findings of fact and 
reproved the brother for taking the findings of facts out of context: 
The portions of the three challenged findings quoted in Almon's brief are 
taken out of context and Almon's argument misapprehends the findings in 
several instances. When read together in their entirety, the three findings 
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are entirely consistent with one another. In addition, the three findings are 
supported by the evidence presented at trial. 
Id. 
Similarly, in the Minnesota Mining case, a man disputed the findings of fact in a 
patent suit. Minnesota Mining 976 F.2d at 1567-1568. The man alleged that some of the 
findings of fact actually supported his position, which was contrary to the lower court's 
holding. Id. The Court agreed that when taken out of context the findings did appear to 
support his arguments, but rejected his reasoning, stating, "However, when the findings 
are reviewed in context, their meaning is clear." Id. 
The Court of Appeals, like the appellants in the Covey and Minnesota Mining 
cases, took one finding of fact out of context and used it to support a premise contrary to 
its original meaning. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that the finding that 
"Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the 
farm," meant that "Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm at a l l . . . " Rowlings v. 
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, P 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). When taken in context with 
the other findings of fact, the undisputed testimony of witnesses, and other evidence at 
trial, the Court of Appeals' reading of that particular finding of fact is obviously 
incorrect. 
Arnold clearly intended to transfer legal title in the trust property to Donald and 
Jeanette with the 1967 deed. This intent was evidenced by Arnold's numerous 
conversations with his children announcing his intent to transfer legal title in the trust 
property, the deed itself, and the correspondence between the Welfare Department and 
Donald about the intended transfer. Using the finding of fact in question, the district court 
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attempted to clarify that Arnold did not intend to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of 
the trust property in their personal capacities. In other words, Arnold did not intend to 
transfer equitable title to the property to Donald and Jeanette when he deeded the trust 
property to them in 1967. 
Arnold's actions demonstrate that he believed that he still held equitable title to 
the land even after signing the 1967 deed. Arnold continued to refer to the trust property 
as "his" property in his written and oral communication until he died. Arnold had 
conversations with LaRell, Bryce, and Dwayne about the trust property being the "family 
farm," and indicated that Arnold expected the trust property would later be reconveyed to 
him or divided among the family fairly. In addition, Arnold and his wife continued to pay 
taxes and use the land in the same manner as before they transferred legal title to Donald 
and Jeanette. 
Both the evidence presented in the case and the other findings of fact show that the 
Court of Appeals5 reading of that particular finding of fact was mistaken. Arnold did 
intend to transfer legal title to Donald and Jeanette, but he did not intend to transfer 
equitable title in the trust property through the 1967 deed. Because Arnold's actions, the 
evidence presented at trial, and the other findings of fact show that Arnold did not intend 
to make Donald and Jeanette the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities, 
but instead intended for Donald to hold the property for him in trust, the Court should 
find that Arnold had the intent to split legal and equitable title through the 1967 
conveyance. 
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ii. Arnold was in a confidential relationship with Donald at the time that Arnold 
transferred legal title of the trust property into Donald's name. 
Under the definition of a "confidential relationship" expressed in Utah case law, 
Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance 
of the trust property from Arnold to Donald. This confidential relationship allows the 
court to properly find that Donald held the trust property in trust for his mother and 
siblings. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45. 
A formal confidential relationship need not exist between the transferor and 
transferee; the superiority of one party and dependence, trust and reliance of the other 
are the important factors in finding a confidential relationship. Hawkins v. Perry, 253 
P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953); Newell v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 414 (Utah 1926). Hawkins 
v. Perry is an example of a case where the court found that a constructive trust was 
properly imposed upon land despite the lack of a formal confidential relationship 
between the transferor and transferee. 253 P.2d at 377. In Hawkins, a nephew gave his 
uncle money to purchase a house. Id. at 373. The uncle purchased the house and 
promised to transfer the property to the nephew upon majority. Id. However, the uncle 
subsequently divorced his wife and the property in question was awarded to her. Id. The 
appellate court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust upon the property in favor 
of the nephew although the confidential relationship was not a formal one. Id. at 376-
377. The court reasoned that: "If by reason of kinship, business association, disparity in 
age, or physical or mental condition or other reason, [one party] is in an especially 
intimate position with regard to the [other], and the latter reposes a high degree of trust 
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and confidence in the former, the court may find that the relationship is technically 
'confidential.'"/d. at 376 (citations omitted). 
Although a parent-child relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential 
relationship, a family relationship characterized such that the transferor is justified in 
believing that the transferee will act in his interest is enough to create a confidential 
relationship. Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 
401 P.2d 710, 713 (Utah 1965); Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); see also Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 636 (Utah 1984); and Blodgett v. 
Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978). This type of confidential relationship existed in 
Haws v. Jensen. In Haws, a mother ("Mrs. Haws") executed a warranty deed in favor of 
her daughter ("Amber") but continued to live on and use the property as her own until 
her death some years later. After the death of Mrs. Haws, Amber and her husband 
resided on the property. After Amber's death, her husband, as Amber's sole heir, 
declared himself the owner of the property. Amber's siblings (and their heirs) brought 
suit, claiming that the warranty deed was intended to create an oral trust with the land to 
be held for the benefit of the entire family. The siblings did not expressly allege in their 
complaint that Amber and Mrs. Haws were in a confidential relationship at the time of 
the transfer. Id. at 217-218. In response to Amber's husband's argument that this lack of 
an allegation in the complaint would preclude the court from finding a confidential 
relationship, the Court gave the following statement: 
The defendant contends that there is no allegation of a confidential relation 
between Amber and Mrs. Haws. True, it is not specifically alleged that 
there was a confidential relation. However, in the complaint it is alleged 
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that Mrs. Haws conveyed the property to Amber intending that the latter 
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family. Implicit in this 
allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs. 
Haws would have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation along with 
the fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and daughter, which 
appears on the face of the complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a 
confidential relation. 
Id. 
The Haws Court then held that the confidential relationship between the mother 
and daughter was sufficient to create a constructive trust under Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts §45 without written evidence, despite the fact that the deed was absolute on its 
face, and despite the fact that no express allegation of a confidential relationship was 
raised in the complaint. Id. at 224. In response to the defendant's allegations that the 
siblings had failed to prove by clear, unequivocal, and conclusive evidence that Amber 
took the property subject to the condition that she hold and use it for her mother's heirs, 
the Court responded that it would not set aside the trial court's findings on conflicting 
evidence unless the findings clearly weighed against the evidence or the trial court 
misapplied proven facts. Id. at 218-219. 
The transferee does not have to be guilty of undue influence, intentional fraud or 
other abuse of his confidential relationship with the transferor for a constructive trust to 
be imposed. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 comment (c); Hawkins v. Perry, 253 
P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1953); Haws v. Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949). The court in 
Haws v. Jensen reviewed the law of constructive trusts and discussed what constitutes an 
abuse of a confidential relationship sufficient to justify imposition a constructive trust: 
A constructive trust will be imposed even though at the time of the transfer 
the transferee intended to perform the agreement, and even though he was 
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not guilty of undue influence in procuring the conveyance. The abuse of the 
confidential relation consists merely in the failure of the transferee 
to perform his promise. Scott on Trusts, Vol. I, Sec. 44.2. A court of equity 
in decreeing a constructive trust, is bound by no unyielding formula, but is 
free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction 
wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in 
unjust enrichment. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1, 1946 Ed., § 
471. 
Id. at 231. 
Although the father-son relationship between Arnold and Donald is not enough 
alone to show that they were in a confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance, 
other factors combine to show that Arnold and Donald had a confidential relationship 
when Arnold transferred title in the trust property to Donald and Jeanette. 
Like both the uncle in the Hawkins case and the daughter in the Haws case, 
Donald was in a position of superiority to Arnold at the time of the conveyance, and 
Arnold depended upon and trusted Donald. The court in Hawkins listed several factors 
and stated that the presence of any one of those factors would allow the court to find that 
the relationship between the parties was technically confidential. Arnold and Donald's 
relationship meets not just one, but several of the factors, including kinship, disparity in 
age, and inferior physical and mental condition of the grantor (Arnold). At the time of the 
conveyance, Arnold was a sick man undergoing brutal treatments for his cancer. He had 
only an eighth grade education and was deeply concerned about losing the trust property 
as a result of his illness and the effect that loss would have on his wife and children. 
Donald, on the other hand, was a healthy young married man. Donald was Arnold's 
oldest son, and when Donald discussed with his ailing and distressed father a solution to 
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Arnold's problem—which involved conveying mere fee title to the trust property to 
Donald and Jeanette so that they could be responsible for taking care of the trust property 
for the family and their father—it was natural for Arnold to trust Donald. That Arnold 
depended upon Donald is evidenced by the fact that Donald, and not Arnold, was 
communicating with the Welfare Department to determine how best to effect the transfer 
of title. At this point, Arnold believed, and was justified in believing, that the transferee, 
Donald, would act in Arnold's best interest. Arnold and Donald's relationship at the time 
of the 1967 conveyance was plainly a confidential relationship. 
The court need not find that Donald is guilty of undue influence or intentional 
fraud in inducing Arnold to convey the property to him in order to impose a constructive 
trust. Because Donald and Arnold were in a confidential relationship and Arnold 
conveyed the property to Donald, the court need only look to see if Donald properly 
performed his obligations as understood when looked at "sensibly and broadly and with 
all human implications" when he accepted the property to hold for his ailing father and 
later declared that the property was his with no obligation to the rest of his family. 
Sinclair, 139 N. E. at 258. If he did not, then the district court's imposition of a 
constructive trust was proper. Haws, 209 P.2d at 231. 
Because Arnold had the necessary intent to split the legal and equitable title to his 
property when he conveyed the land to Donald in 1967, and Arnold and Donald were in a 
confidential relationship at the time of the conveyance, this Court should find that the 
Court of Appeals' reversal of the constructive trust imposed by the district court was 
improper. 
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B. The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the imposition of a constructive trust on the 
trust property under the Restatement of Restitution §160 because Donald and 
Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to retain the trust property without 
the imposition of a constructive trust 
This court should uphold the District Court's imposition of a constructive trust on 
the trust property because Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were to 
retain the title to the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust. The 
Restatement of Restitution §160 declares, "Where a person holding title to property is 
subject tot an equitable duty to convey it to another ion the ground that he would be 
unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises. Restatement 
of Restitution §160. 
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, and the 
court has broad discretion in how it applies this remedy; the court is "bound by no 
unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each 
transaction wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust 
enrichment." Haws 209 P.2d at 232 (quoting 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1, 
1946 Ed., §471); Restatement of Restitution §160; Parks v. Zions First NatfI Bank, 673 
P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977); 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); see also 
Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009); Kopp v. Tubies, 2008 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 
Dec. LEXIS 82, 9-10 (Pa. County Ct. 2008); Murphy v. Middleton, 256 S.W.3d 159, 166-
167 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008); Meadows v. Bierschwale, 516 S.W.2d 125, 131 (Tex. 1974). 
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County of Lake v. X-Po Sec. Police Service, Inc., 27 111. App. 3d 750, 755 (111. App. Ct. 
2d Dist. 1975). Carnesecca v. Carnesecca provides a situation where the court imposed a 
constructive trust to prevent unjust enrichment. 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977). A father 
acquired certain property. Id. at 709. While his second son was in the army, the father's 
first and third sons purchased the property from the father. Id. Later, the father required 
the first and third sons to permit the second son to purchase a one-third interest in the 
property, although title still remained in the names of the first and third sons. Id. When 
the parties sold the property after the third son's death, the third son's widow attempted 
to claim one-half of the money from the sale, claiming that she had title to half of the 
property. Id. at 710. The court affirmed the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust 
and concluded that the facts that the success of the farm had "obviously resulted from the 
combined industry of the whole family," and that the second son had spent considerable 
time and effort improving and working the land supported the imposition of a 
constructive trust. Id., at 710-711. 
Similarly, the Missouri court of appeals recently heard a case where a mother had 
deeded property to her daughter approximately 16 years before and sought the imposition 
of a constructive trust on that property. Murphy v. Middleton, 256 S.W.3d 159, 166-167 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2008). The court held that the conveyance from the mother to daughter 
was a gift, but gave a helpful statement regarding the purposes of a constructive trust: 
Although not technically a trust, a "constructive trust" is merely the 
machinery a court of equity uses as a remedy to right a past wrong. It has 
been stated that the constructive trust is the device used by chancery to 
force one who unfairly holds a property interest to convey that interest to 
another to whom it justly belongs. It is a "method by which a court 
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exercises its equitable powers to 'remedy a situation where a party has been 
wrongfully deprived of some right, title, benefit or interest in property as a 
result of fraud or in violation of confidence or faith reposed in another."5 
Id. (citations omitted). 
In a recent case in Pennsylvania, the court examining a constructive trust case 
examined what circumstances give rise to a constructive trust: 
A constructive trust is a formula through which the conscience of equity 
finds expression. When property is acquired under circumstances that the 
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial 
interests, equity converts him to a trustee. Thus, a constructive trust arises 
where a person holds title to a property subject to an equitable duty to 
convey it to another on the ground that he or she would be unjustly 
enriched if permitted to retain it. Before a constructive trust can arise, it is 
necessary that the owner of the property must have acquired title to it in 
some way that creates an equitable duty in favor of the person seeking to 
benefit from imposition of the trust. 
Kopp v. Tubies, 2008 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 82, 9-10 (Pa. County Ct. 
2008)(citations omitted). 
A constructive trust, unlike other types of trusts, does not require a manifestation 
of intent to create a trust and may be imposed by law regardless of the intention of the 
parties. Restatement of Restitution §160, cmt. a; Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 
590, 598 (Utah 1983); Wells Fargo Bank American Trust Co. v. Greuner, 226 Cal. App. 
2d 454, 460 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1964); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009). In 
Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the court imposed a constructive trust contrary to the 
intent of the grantor. 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983) A man's wife died and left her estate 
to the bank and to the hospital, with a monthly allowance for her husband. Id. at 594. 
During the marriage, the wife had managed the couple's financial affairs, while most of 
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the property was purchased with the husbands earnings. Id. at 591. The husband sought to 
impose a constructive trust on certain furnishings and on the real property. Id. at 595. 
This court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust and declared that the forms and 
varieties of constructive trusts are virtually without limit. Id. at 597 This court also 
clarified that constructive trusts are not dependant on the intention of the parties: 
[Constructive trusts generally are not based upon the 'intention' of the 
parties. Indeed, the most notable distinction between constructive trusts and 
other types of trusts, such as express and resulting trusts, is generally the 
'intention' element. It is axiomatic that an essential element of any 
agreement is the 'intention' to create it. Accordingly, those constructive 
trusts which may arise without proof of the parties' 'intention' to create a 
trust cannot and do not require, as defendants propose, that some form of 
agreement be manifested." 
Id. at 598. 
A constructive trust may be imposed even if the trust is directly in conflict with 
legal title of the property. Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank 673 P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 
1983). In Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the court broadly defined situations in 
which the imposition of a constructive trust is appropriate: 
Constructive trusts include all those instances in which a trust is raised by the 
doctrines of equity for the purpose of working out justice in the most efficient 
manner, where there is no intention of the parties to create such a relation, and in 
most cases contrary to the intention of the one holding the legal title, and where 
there is no express or implied, written or verbal, declaration of the trust. 
Id. at 599(quoting J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1044 
(1941)). 
When determining whether a constructive trust is the proper equitable remedy, the 
totality of circumstances and setting will be taken into account. Legault v. Legault, 459 
A.2d 980, 984 (Vt. 1983); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009); McGrath v. 
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Eliding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331, 394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1977). In 
Legault v. Legault, a court imposed a constructive trust because the totality of 
circumstances showed that unjust enrichment would occur if a constructive trust were not 
imposed. Legault 459 A.2d at 984. A father sought to recover money from his foster 
daughter through the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 982. The father had, 
through the thirty-four years of his marriage, turned his paycheck over to his wife each 
week for her to pay the bills and deposit the money in their joint account. Id. After the 
wife's death, the father found that the alleged joint account his wife had told him she was 
depositing the money in never existed. Id. Instead, the wife was depositing the money 
into a joint account for her and the foster daughter. Id. The court imposed a constructive 
trust on the money in the account in favor of the father, finding that it would be 
inequitable for the foster daughter to retain the money. Id. at 984. The court counseled 
that, when dealing with constructive trusts and equitable remedies, courts should examine 
the totality of the circumstances regarding the situation, and not limit the inquiry to one 
transaction: 
Moreover, the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment rests upon the principle 
"that a man shall not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of 
another." In other words, the inquiry is whether, in light of the totality of 
circumstances, it is against equity and good conscience to allow defendant to 
retain what is sought to be recovered. Thus, "whether there is unjust enrichment 
may not be determined from a limited inquiry confined to an isolated transaction. 
It must be a realistic determination based on a broad view of the human setting 
involved." 
Id. at 984. 
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Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conveyance from 
Arnold to Donald and the subsequent actions of the parties involved, the court should 
conclude that Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to 
become the owners of the trust property in their personal capacities and to keep the 
proceeds from the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust. Like the 
family farm in the Carnesecca case, the success of the Rawlings trust property was a 
direct result of the combined industry of the whole family. Testimony from Donald and 
the other siblings is that everyone except Donald worked on the trust property in the 
years following the 1967 conveyance while Arnold was alive and after his death. In 
addition, the record shows that Donald received help from his family to put up fences 
during the Vineyard Meadows dispute, which aided Donald in reaching a settlement 
agreement. Donald and Jeanette, who co-mingled the proceeds from the operation of the 
trust property—including proceeds from the settlement agreement—with their own 
money, would be unjustly enriched without the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Arnold and Cleo paid the back taxes on the land even after the 1967 conveyance, 
and Arnold continued to use and treat the land as his own, taking responsibility for the 
care and maintenance of the trust property without Donald's help, and without 
compensation from Donald. Indeed, the proceeds from the trust property were used for 
the support of Arnold's widow, Cleo, and Donald represented to the other members of the 
family when he asked for the quit claim deeds in 1974 that he needed their help to save 
their mother's farm. 
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In spite of the testimonies given by the other members of the family and Arnold's 
actions to the contrary, Donald and Jeanette maintain that they were deeded the land in 
fee simple in 1967 as compensation for paying off the mortgage on the land with the bank 
and saving the land from being lost. However, the only evidence that Donald and Jeanette 
have of their "mortgage payment" is the handwritten notation on the only checks 
produced, which was written by Jeanette after this litigation began. Their bank records 
show that no payments other than those made by those checks were made by them to 
Walker Bank during that time. Evidence has been introduced that Donald and his wife 
had additional loans with the bank at that time, and it is reasonable to infer that the 
payments they allege they were making on Arnold's mortgage were actually payments on 
their own loans at the bank. Taken with the testimony of the all of the other brothers, 
who stated that they were led to understand that the conveyance would be temporary if 
Arnold recovered and that the land would go to the family if he did not, the court can 
reasonably infer that Arnold's purpose in conveying the land to Donald was the express 
purpose that he stated many times: to get the land out of his name as the Welfare 
Department advised him to do. Since Arnold did not intend for the land to be 
compensation to Donald for a payment of a mortgage loan, Donald would be unjustly 
enriched if he were to keep the land without the imposition of a constructive trust. 
Even if this Court accepts the Court of Appeals' reading of the finding of fact 
regarding Arnold's intent to transfer the land and determine that he did not intend to 
transfer the land at all, the Court may still properly impose a constructive trust under 
Restatement §160. The Court of Appeals stated that without Arnold's intent to create a 
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trust, no constructive trust could be imposed. However, as the court expressed in the 
Parks case, a constructive trust, unlike other trusts, does not depend on the intent of the 
parties and may be imposed contrary to the intention of the party holding the legal title. 
The court is "bound by no unyielding formula" when it imposes a constructive trust to 
prevent unjust enrichment, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are virtually 
unlimited. If the court accepts the Court of Appeals' reasoning that "Arnold did not 
intend to transfer the farm at all," then Donald is still unjustly enriched. If Arnold did not 
intend to transfer the trust property to Donald, and after numerous years of watching his 
family perform work on the trust property knowing that they believed that the work they 
were doing was for a farm in which they all had an interest (and expressing to them that 
the trust property and its proceeds were to help their widowed mother) but performing no 
work himself, Donald claims the property and all the proceeds for himself, he is unjustly 
enriched, and the court may impose a constructive trust regardless of the intent of the 
parties. 
Because, regardless of Arnold's intent to create a trust at the time of the 1967 
conveyance, Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to 
retain title to the trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust, this Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision and impose a constructive trust on the trust 
property. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court hold that the Court of Appeals erred in 
reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive trust. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /j_ day of May 2009. 
ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC 
THOMAS W. SEILER 
Attorney for Petitioners 
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Final Order 
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2008) (Dated December, 26, 2008). 
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Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings 
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IN THE FOURTH .TUDTCIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANBTTE 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
Defendants. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLMGS, as Trustees of the 
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust, 
THERON LaRBLL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R. 
MASTERSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No 970400260 
Division No. 9 
M. DAYLB JEFFS, #1655 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Third-Party Plainli Ffs 
Theron LaRcll Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, 
and Carol Lynn R. Mastcrson 
90 North 100 East 
P O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801)373-8878 
vs. 
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS 
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
THERON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R. 
MASTERSON, 
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs 
vs. 
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and 
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD 
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE 
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE 
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is 
unknown, 
Third Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated 
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of 
evidence and by agreement, each of the parties submitted aPost-TrialMemorandummarshalinglheir 
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties1 
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered its ruling 
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on the bifurcated issue, the Court now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law on the issue of constructive trust: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Arnold J. Rawlings (hereinafter ''Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings (hereinafter "Cleo") 
had five children who are, in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (hereinafter "Donald"), Arnold 
Dwayne Rawlings (hereinafter ccDwayne"). Theron LaRell Rawlings (hereinafter "LaReir), Bryce 
C. Rawlings (hereinafter "Bryce"), and Carol Lynn Rawlings Mastcrson (hereinafter "Carol"). 
2. Arnold Rawlings acquired the property from his mother in 1944. From that time until 
the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was not on the title to the property at issue in this case. 
Cleo has no ownership interest in the farm property. 
3. Arnold solely owned approximately 22.37 acres of property in Orem, Arnold sold 
12 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres. 
4 Tn 1962 Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne 
Rawlings and spouse on which they built a home. Tn 1967 a very small piece was deeded to Dwayne 
and spouse by Arnold between the property where Arnold's home was and where Dwayne and 
spouse built there home, hi 1960 Arnold deeded to Donald and spouse a property slightly to the west 
of the property deeded to Dwayne. Donald built his home on that property. Adjacent to the home 
on which Donald built his home, Arnold deeded in 1964 property to Donald which has been referred 
Lo as the barn property, in 1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of 
Dwayne's home ("the garden") and the other south of the barn property ("the orchard"). 
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5. In 1963 the farm was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed. 
(Exhibit S) 
6. hi 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a Conditional Sales Contract with the 
pledge of a Ford trust and an Oidsmobile automobile. 
7- The transaction consisted of a rewri ting of the loan with the replacement of security. 
8. By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately 
required medical attention. 
9. Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the Welfare Department 
about his intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was corroborated 
by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department refemng to a prior meeting, and provides proff 
of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt. 
10. On December 22,2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, 
following which he labored to recover from his illness. 
11. in January of 1967, Arnold began a series of 20 cobalt treatments. The medical 
attention that Arnold required was extremely expensive. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the 
medical treatment and received welfare assistance. 
12. Donald Rawlings discussed his intention to transfer Arnold's property into Donald's 
name (see Exhibit 8, a letter dated December 16,1966, from the Utah County Department of Public 
Welfare to Donald Rawlings). 
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13. The letter from the Welfare Department was addressed to Donald, not to Arnold or 
Cleo, the persons receiving the benefits from the Welfare Department pertaining to his illness. 
14. The Utah County Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter "Welfare Department11) 
would pay the majority of the medical expenses associated with Arnold's illness if Arnold's property 
was not in his name (other than Arnold's home). 
15. Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital for additional medical treatment on 
February 16„ 1967, Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital again for yet more medical 
treatment on March 14, 1967. 
16. The undisputed testimony is that Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and he was 
in very poor health on March 24,1967. He was somewhat advanced in age. He had an eighth grade 
or less education and was very concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare 
Department. 
17. Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder on 
March 24,1967, Arnold deeded the property referred to as the farm property or the trust property to 
Donald and spouse. Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal description. Althougli 
Cleo' s signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership interest in the trust property, and there was 
no testimony given as to why she executed any deed that was offered into evidence in this matter. 
18. On March 24,1967, Arnold conveyed by Warranty Deed three parcels to D wayne and 
spouse. This deed, with plats as to each of the three parcels, was admitted as Exhibits 14, 15, and 
16. The undisputed testimony was that parcel 1 was a small portion between Arnold's homes and 
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Dwayne's home which Arnold had sometime earlier sold to Dwayne and spouse. Further, the 
undisputed testimony was that parcel 2 on Exhibits 14, 15, and 16 has been continuously held by 
Dwayne as part of the constructive trust property for and on behalf of the family members to be 
distributed as the Court orders. 
19. On March 2471967, a Quit-Claim Deed (hereinafter ctthe sibling deed") was signed 
by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, andBryce and spouse to Donald and spouse. This 
sibling deed contained a legal description for the trust property. Overtime, small neighboring pieces 
of property were added to the trust property m various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most 
sibling spouses. 
20. The undisputed testimony is that the operation of the trust property or the family farm 
continued exactly the same before and after March 24, 1967, except that, because of Arnold's 
weakened physical condition, sometimes he could do very little work. Donald also testified on cross 
examination, when confronted with his deposition testimony, that although Arnold would go down 
to the property and Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell helped on the property "all 1 (Donald) know is that 
J didn't" 
21. On cross examination Donald also admitted, when confronted with his deposition 
testimony, that Arnold continued to have property until 1970. 
22. After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that income 
from the trust property was being used to support their mother. 
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23. Both before and after March 24, 1967, and both before and after Arnold's death, 
Donald's siblings, sometimes their spouses and sometimes their children, worked in the orchard on 
the trust property, the work done after Arnold's death was with the understanding that the income 
was to be used to support Geo, 
24. In 1974, the Vineyard Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south 
boundary line of the trust property (see Exhibit 1). As it was developed, fences were placed in the 
backyards of the homes in Vineyard Meadows Subdivision, generally along the south boundary line 
of the trust property. Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon 
"Mother's farm.-" At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm/' Dwayne 
and his son worked with Donald and his son lo place a fence through the backyards of the home 
owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for "Mother's farm" was. Dwayne 
regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Samt ward with the people who lived in 
those homes. He and his spouse were friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed 
testimony is, in order to assist in the protection of the family farm or trust property, Dwayne and his 
son placed fencing in those yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was 
resolved. Donald caused some of the flmds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings 
(LaRell refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. This included the 
purchase of a car, 
25. As part of du's boundary dispute with Vineyard Meadows Subdivision home owners, 
Donald convinced his siblings to sign another deed in 1974, which he explained to diem contained 
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a legal description only of the disputed area. The deed named Donald and spouse as grantees. In 
fact, it contained a mach larger legal description that included all of the trust property. If, in fact, 
Donald and spouse had owned the property before, no such deed would have been necessary. 
26 In April of 1978, Donald and spouse deeded a Vx interest in a portion of the trust 
property to Dwayne and spouse. This property appears as Exhibit 1 as the Pincgar property. The 
Pinegar property was then deeded as part of a 1031 exchange to Mr. and Mrs. Jack Hadley and Mr-
and Mrs. Merrill Gappmayer. Out of that exchange, Donald and spouse and Dwayne and spouse 
were deeded property located on Mountain Way Drive and 400 South in Orem^ which was referred 
to throughout the Trial as the industrial property The Pinegar property was credited as a 1/3 down 
payment, or $15,000 00 of the $45,000.00 purchase price of the industrial property. The balance of 
the purchase price was paid for, $15,000.00 by Donald md spouse and $15,000.00 by Dwayne and 
spouse through loans obtained by the respective parties. 
27. Donald and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29, 
2966, upon which the bank surrendered its conditional sales contract. (Exhibit 9) 
28. The conditional sales contract was stamped "paid." 
29. The conditional contract shows that it was a stamped "paid" on December 15,1966 
altered by ink to show a date of December 29,1966. 
30. By the terras of the conditional sales constract, the bank's remedy was a recourse to 
the automobile company under a full recourse clause. 
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31. In addition, the bank had a security interest in the Ford truck and Oldsmobiie which 
could have been foreclosed and taken m satisfaction of the remaining debt. Tf a foreclosure of the 
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 90 days 
to for the debtors to cure the default before the Notice of Sale could have been published. No such 
recording was ever produced and is not a record in the Utah County Recorder's Office 
32. No evidence was presented that the check for $579,06 was the required loan payoff 
amount. 
33. Joanettc (Donald's spouse) testified that she and Donald had indebtedness with 
Walker Bank and Trust Company for the building of their home at the same time period. 
34. In 1966 and 1967, Donald and spouse had loans with the Walker Bank. Commencing 
June 29, 1966, Donald and spouse made the following payments, by check, to Walker Bank: 
[~~ DATE 
j June 29,1966 
July 19, 2966 
August 10, 1966 
wSeplember 21, 1966 
j October 19, 1966 
November 21, 1966 
December 29, 1966 
[TOTAL 
AMOUNT | 
$150.00 | 
100 00 | 
100.00 | 
100.00 | 
100 00 
100.00 
579.061 
$1,229.06 
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35. Donald and Jeanctte's banking records offered into evidence during the trial revealed 
no other payments to Walker Bank daring the time frame, in spite of uncontroverted testimony of 
Jeanette Rawlings, that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been 
made with Walker Bank and trust during that time frame. 
36. Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance on the trust deed (Exhibit 
9) at die same time. That testimony, however, is unpersuasive. 
37. The deeding ofthe trust propertyto Donald and Jeanette occurred onMarch24,1967, 
some three months after the alleged payment ofthe Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs. 
38. After the litigation commenced, Donald's spouse, Jeannette Rawlings, altered the 
checks evidencing the above payments, by adding language on each of them to indicate they were 
paid to Wallcer Bank and Trust Company for and on behalf of Arnold Rawlings. It was only during 
the May 9, 2005 deposition of Jeannette Rawlings (Donald's spouse) that she admitted to the 
alteration ofthe documentary evidence, by notations made after this suit was filed, for the purpose 
of designating those checks as checks paid on Arnold Rawlings5 account, 
39. Noting those circumstances, the Court is nnpersnaded that the Plaintiffs9 assertions 
regarding the December 29, 1966, check and concludes the Plaintiffs' statements are not supported 
by the records and the evidence. 
40. The Court is unpersuaded that the farm was deeded by the parties' father to Donald 
and Jeanette because of die payment ofthe alleged indebtedness. 
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41. During trial, neither Donald nor Jeanette testified the reason for the deed was because 
they had paid off the loan. 
42. No testimony was presented of any agreement between Donald and his father that the 
farm was deeded because of payment of the indebtedness, 
43. LaRcll Rawlings testified that in late February or early March that his father had a 
conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he needed to get the property out of Arnold's 
name because of the Welfare Department's requirement that it be transferred out of his name. 
44. LaRell suggested it be placed in Dwayne's name as he would be most fair with the 
family. 
45. At a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a restaurant with both Donald and Arnold 
present, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald because of the Welfare 
requirement for receiving assistance. 
46. That conversation (see Paragraph 45) was in the presence of Donald7 was undisputed 
by Donald at trial, and remains uncontradicted and unrebutted. 
47. No mention was made in that conversation of any payment of the Walker Bank debt 
or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Bank debt. 
48. One or two days before Mary 24,1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald 
and Arnold met with Dwayne Rawlings and infonned him that they were deeding the trust property 
to Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consistent with other 
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concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer had anything to 
do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt. 
49. No where in this proceeding have Donald or Jeanette testified disputing that the 
testimony of Dwayne to the meeting two days before the conveyance of the trust property. 
50. In January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on the 
trust property, Dwayne borrowed $1,000.00 ixom the credit union at Geneva Steel and endorsed that 
check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which Donald alleged weie due 
on the trust property. Donald did not deliver this $1,000,00 to the Utah County Assessor for 
paynient of real estate taxes until after the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold. 
51. If the March 24, 1967, deed had been intended to transfer ownership to Donaid for 
the payment of the Walker Bank debt in December of 1966, Arnold would not have been concerned 
about paying the back taxes, as it would be Donald's responsibility. 
52. On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused $1,267.00 ($1,000.00 of which was 
paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust property and on other 
properties owned by Donald and spouse. 
53. It is unrebutted that Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were all told that the March 
24,1967, conveyance to Donald and spouse was because Arnold had to get the property out of his 
name as required by the Welfare Department. 
54. Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of 
Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject 
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55. There has heen inadequate explanation by Donald and spouse as to why the siblings 
and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked 10 sign the March 2471967 
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 12. 
56. After March 24, 1967, deed, Arnold continued to treat the farm as his own. 
57. Bryce Rawlings testified that his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald 
and spouse intending only to make it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter 
their expected shares of the farm. 
58. hi February of 1970, LaRell was in the military. Arnold asked that the military 
release or discharge LaRell early to help on Arnold's farm, the trust property. Tn that regard, the 
Court admitted the following into evidence: 
a. Exhibit 22, a letter from Kent Stewart of the Utah State Department of 
Highways, which stated m part: 
"With LaRelPs brothers either unable or unwilling to help their father with his farm, 
the future would be veiy precarious for him financially... In my opinion the only 
way Arnold Rawlings could operate his farm is with the fixll time help of Ms son, 
L a R e l l . . . " 
b. Exhibit 23, a letter dated February 18, 1970, addressed to the commanding 
officer of Dugway Proving Grounds and signed by Darryl M. Williams, MD. The letter first explains 
that Arnold has had a diagnosis of lymphosarcoma and states: ifiMr. Rawlings complains of 
generalized symptoms that apparently prevent him from carrying on his normal work as a farmer." 
Doctor Williams goes on the state that Arnold "does at the present time have evidence of 
active disease; the prognosis in this instance must be considered guarded." 
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c. Exhibit 24, a letter from Dr. Watson L. Lafferty dated February 16n 1970, 
states, in part: 
"Mr. Rawlings has been under my care for one year, with a cronic [sic] health 
condition and is unable to do his farming. Due to his inability to do the hard labor 
which is necessary to operate his farm the need for his son is very urgent." 
d. Exhibit 25 is a letter dated February 16,1970 and signed, by the Honorable 
Merrill L. Hermansen, Third Distiict Juvenile Court, State of Utah. Judge Hermansen explains that 
he became acquainted with Arnold's medical condition because Arnold and Judge Hermansen were 
confined in Utah Valley Hospital at the same time. Judge Hermansen goes on to stale; 
"I am aware that he is disabled with cancer and that he has as his only means of 
support the operation of a small farm also located in the Orem area. His illness 
makes it impossible for him to operate this farm, and it is almost his only income, 
I would therefore recommend that a hardship discharge be granted to Tlierin [sic] 
LaRell Rawlings in order that he may take care of this urgent family problem, to wit: 
that of the support of his mother and father.'* 
e. A letter dated February 10,1970 addressed to the U.S. Army and written to 
Leo G. Meredith, manager of Chipman's Mercantile Company in American Fork, Utah- Mr. 
Meredith states: 
"[LaRell] and [Arnold]...have operated together in a project of raising fruit, together 
with pleasure horses for sale. The Father is working under a handicap of a health 
problem to a point where he is unable to do any of the work connected with breaking 
and training the horses for sale, nor is he able to do any of the heavy work related to 
the production of the fruit and the sale of thereof." 
f. Exhibit 27 is a sworn statement of Glen Merrill dared February 20, 1970. 
Therein he states: 
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"[Arnold] is unable to take care of Ms orchard and small farm. [Arnold] has no one 
who is free to help him Ha has a single son, LaRell, who lived with his mother and 
father and attend to these necessary duties but is now in the Army stationed at 
Dugway, Utah, 
"I believe it would be better for all concerned if LaRell could be released to again 
look after the welfare of his aging and sick parents. This is a hardship case." 
g. Exhibit2S is alerter from the Honorable Noal IT, Wootton. Mr, Wootton was 
an attorney who practice for many years in Utah County but who passed away m 2006, Mr, Wootton 
makes the following affirmative representations to the commanding officer of Dugway Proving 
Grounds: 
(1) He represents Arnold. 
(2) Arnold is disabled with cancer. 
(3) Arnold's sole source of support is a 10-acre farm which he operates. 
(4) Without the aid of LaRell, Arnold and Cleo are going to suffer extreme 
hardships. 
h. Exhibit 29 is a letter dated January 14, 1970, from Ray E, Gammon. Mr. 
Gammon was a long-time attorney in Utah County who is now retired. Mr. Gammon makes the 
following affirmative representations: 
(1) He has known LaRell and his family for the past several years. 
(2) LaRell has taken care of the family orchard. 
(3) Arnold has been and is receiving treatment for cancer. 
(4) Arnold is unable to care for the farm. 
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58. Tn addition to doctors, lawyers, a judge, and businessmen, Arnold, himself, executed 
not one but two affidavits. 
a. Exhibit 19 is an affidavit executed byArnold dated February 13,1970. Inthe 
February 13,1970 affidavit, Arnold swears: 
"that he his engaged as a farmer, Livestock Raiser, and for many years has been 
dependent upon his son, Theron LaRell Rawlings, to assist him in the operation of 
his farm." 
'That the undersigned is 64 years of age and is severely afflicted with cancer and is 
able to do but little of the work required for the operation of his faroi, and he is badly 
in need of the services of said son to assist him in the planting, cultivating, irrigating, 
and harvesting of his crops and in caring for his livestock." 
b. Exhibit 20 is Arnold's second affidavit. In that affidavit Arnold swears that; 
(1) He has health problems which makes it impossible to do the hard labor 
required by the farm. 
(2) Last fall he lost several hundred bushels of pears because he could not get 
them picked and to market in time. 
(3) That he has three other boys living in the area, but that he had not been 
getting any help from them. 
(4) That LaRell had stayed at home and helped since his illness a few years 
ago, and that LaRell was the only one he could turn to at that time. 
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59. The letters referred to in paragraph 57 and the affidavits of Arnold Rawlmgs 
(paragraph 58) make it clear that the farm was still Arnold's. The only purpose for deeding the farm 
into Donald's name could have been for protection against the Welfare Department. 
60 Exhibits 52 and 57 are Arnold* s medical records for December 1966 through March 
1871969. The medical records note that on February 16, 1967, shortly before the execution of the 
deeds which create the constractive trust in this matter, that Arnold was admitted to the hospital 
because of his inability to care for himself at home. Arnold had presented an immediate distress 
from an abscessed area of his right groin. 
6L The medical records make it clear that after the December 22, 1966 surgery, Arnold 
underwent approximately 20 treatments of high energy radiotherapy (cobalt 60) and that the dosage 
administered was approximately 400 RAD (TD). They go on to say: 
"Subsequently, the patient did well until 1967. At that time, during a routine 
follow up examination, the patient was noted to have bi-latcral axillary 
lymphadenopathy as well as evidence of "chest involvement" Because of this, he 
was again treated with cobalt therapy at St. Marks Hospital in December 1967." 
62. Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the 
property. 
63. Arnold also requested and procured help from a number of people supporting his 
request to have LaRcll discharged from the military to help him work "his" farm, as referenced by 
Exhibits 22, and 24-29, 
64. After the March 24,1967, deed, Donald did not help in fanning the trust property of 
his father. 
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65. On March 1,1971, Arnold Rawlings died. 
66. During all of Arnold's lifetime, all of the income from the trust property went to 
Arnold. After Arnold's death,, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the income from 
the trust property was being used to support their mother. 
67. On March 30,1971, Cleo Rawlings, his widow, paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which 
included all of the trust property. 
68. Such evidence also supports the factual conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the 
farm (the trust property) was the family farm* 
69. Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission from Arnold to put a 
trailer on the trust property for a residence. Arnold showed Bryce where on the trust property to 
place the trailer, and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm (the trust property) for four or five years 
following his father's death. This evidence supports the conclusion that the parties considered the 
farm a family farm. 
70. Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence line 
across the encroaching developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with the title 
companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000.00. (See paragraph 24 
above.) 
71. From these proceeds, Donald gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to 
Dwayne, with approximately $5,000 for a care and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. He offered 
$500 to LaRell which LaRell refused. 
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72. Donald testified that the 1974 Quit-Claim Deed was not to convey any interest in the 
property from his siblings but was only to clear up the title problem on the south boundary. The 
Court is unpersuaded by Donald*s testimony. 
73. In 1978 Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pinegar 
Lot to Dwayne and Paulcttc. 
74. In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Hellwell property, shown as Exhibit 
1, for 6.5 acres in Washington County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the 
Hellwell trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, told any sibling they believed they owned 
the trust properly, and they were using the funds or income from the trust property in any way they 
chose. 
75. The work of all the family members on the farm, except Donald, on the irrigating, 
harvesting, and marketing of the fruit, the management of the horses and the proceeds of tbe fruit 
being given to the mother, Cleo, the waiting of so long to' take action by the siblings is readily 
apparent by the trust that they had in their older brother (Donald) that he would do what was right, 
but by his own actions during the period following the conveyance all demonstrate the faim as a 
family farm. I 
76. The testimony is undisputed that Donald co-mingled the funds from the trustproperty 
with his other funds and is unable to distinguish any funds which he spent at any time from March 
24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their source whether they came froqa the trust property income or 
from income from some other source. 
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11. The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion 
that the siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in their older brother that he would 
do what was right for the family, and as buttressed by then- own actions during the period following 
the conveyance. 
78. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of a final judgment 
consistent with the findings and conclusions herein. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact by the Court, the Court now makes and enters the 
following conclusions of law: 
1. The March 24, 1967, deed from Arnold and Cleo Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette 
Rawlings was not for the payment of debt to Walker Banlc and Trust Company or for the payment 
of taxes. 
2. The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to transfer ownership to 
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings, 
3. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the foregoing findings of fact 
establish a equitable need to impose a constructive trust on the property conveyed hi the 1967 deeds 
and the 1974 deeds. 
4. The actions regarding the property by Donald and Jeanette are for the benefit of the 
trust property. 
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5. From the inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received 
unjust enrichment of the property which they treated as their own which included $15000.00 of the 
rouglily $ 1,200.00 taxes that were paid by Dwayne and his spouse, the barn property, the proceeds 
from the operation of the trust property, and approximately $523000.00 from negotiated payments 
regarding the south boundary fence dispute as well as other benefits from the use and negotiations 
relative to the trust property. 
6. The Court concludes that it should enter a final judgment on the issue that was tried 
as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the constructive trust issue pursuant 
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED and SIGNED this ^ > day of August, 2007.. 
BY THE COURT 
M. David Eckersly 
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON 
Thomas W. Seller 
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90 North 100 East 
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THOMAS W. SEILER, #2910 
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Aniold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings 
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IN THE FOURTH J UDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
Defendants. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the 
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust, 
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLTNGS, and CAROL LYNN R. 
MASTERSON, 
JUDGMENT ON ISSUE OF 
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND RULE 
54(B) DETERMINATION 
Civil No. 970400260 
Qivision No. 9 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD RAWL1NGS and XEANETTE 
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS 
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
THBRON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R. 
MASTERSON, 
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs 
vs. 
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and 
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD 
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE 
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE 
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, | 
as Trustees of a Trust whoso name is 
unknown, | 
Third Party Defendants. J 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated 
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constmctive trust. Following the presentation of 
evidence and by agreement, each o f the parties submitted a Post-Tri al Mem orandum marshaling their 
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties' 
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered its-ruling 
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on the bifurcated issue, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now 
makes and enters the following: ' 
JUDGMENT ON CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ISSUE 
1. The conveyances by the 1967 and 1974 deeds created a constructive trust on the 
property described therein. 
2. The Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay entry of judgment herein 
on the issue that was tried as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the 
constructive trust issue pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED and SIGNED this "^g?day of August, 2007.
 ; 
BY THE COURT 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
. *^r«w. _ ^ \ , > 
M. David Eckersly 
ROBINSON, SEHJBRS, & ANDERSON 
id 
Thomas W. Seiler 
JEFFS & JEFFS. P.C. 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
FLAWLINGS, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
Defendants. 
\RNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and 
'AULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the 
knold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust, 
ffiERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
IAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R, 
vlASTERSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffe, 
vs. 
)ONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
IAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS 
nd JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees 
if a Trust whose name is unknown, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
SANCTIONS, FOR PAYMENT OF 
MEDIATOR'S FEES, AND FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF OPPOSING 
COUNSEL 
Civil No. 970400260 
Judge Howard 
HERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C. 
IAWLJNGS, and CAROL LYNN & 
MSTERSON, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE 
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and 
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a 
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD 
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE 
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE 
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, 
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is unknown, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the Order to Show Cause issued by the Court on 
October 12, 2006, requiring Plaintiffs to appear before this Court on the 13th day of November at 
9:00 AM. and show cause, if any they have, why fees and sanctions should not be imposed for 
alleged failure to comply with Rules 101(c) and/or 101(h) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed 
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Said order had been issued pursuant to the motion of Theron 
LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn Masterson as third party plaintiffs and 
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings as defendants and third party plaintiffs Joint 
Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and for Attorney's Fees of Opposing 
Counsel. The Court having read the respective submissions of the parties and having carefully 
read and reread the language of the rules, the Court having reviewed the Court Rules for Court-
Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution several times, and having heard the oral arguments of 
counsel for and against said motion, and being fully advised on the premises, now makes and 
enters the following: 
Rule 101(c) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution provides 
in pertinent part that "All parties shall be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the 
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case...The mediation conference should proceed 
in a fashion that furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves confidentiality, and 
encourages candor on the part of participating parties." 
That provision requires good faith discussion, and while parties may temrinate that 
process, they may only do so after they have engaged in the settlement process in good faith. 
Afer a careful review of the record and being fully advised in the premises by counsel for all 
parties, I find that the Plaintiffs came to the mediation with a fully formed intention not to 
participate in the mediation in good faith and had determined that they would not be prepared to 
discuss all relevant issues in this case. I find these actions and formed intentions to violate Rule 
101(c), above. Therefore, based upon Rule 101(c), above, and the inherent powers of the Court, 
the Court grants the Joint Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees and for 
Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel pursuant to the affidavits filed with the joint motion. The 
Court orders the Plaintiffs pay the sum of $2,937.00 to the moving parties within 30 days. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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Donald Rawlings and Jeanette 
Rawlings, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
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Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and 
Paulette Rawlings, 
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of the Arnold Dwayne Rawlings 
Family Trust; Theron LaRell 
Rawlings; Bryce C. Rawlings; 
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Attorneys: M. David Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
M. Dayle Jeffs and Thomas W. Seiler, Provo, for 
Appellees 
Before Judges Greenwood, Thorne, and Orme. 
THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge: 
fl Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (collectively, the Grantees) 
appeal from the district court's entry of judgment finding an 
equitable constructive trust in favor of Dwayne and Paulette 
Rawlings, LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R. 
Masterson (collectively, the Siblings).1 We reverse the judgment 
of the district court, as well as an order imposing sanctions 
against the Grantees for failing to participate in mediation 
proceedings in good faith. 
%2 This dispute centers on a family farm that Arnold Rawlings 
transferred to the Grantees by deed in 1967. The Grantees are 
Arnold and Cleo Rawlings's oldest son, Donald, and Donald1s wife, 
Jeanette. The Siblings comprise the rest of Arnold and Cleo's 
children, along with Dwayne's wife, Paulette. As summarized in 
greater detail below, the Grantees' position in this litigation 
is that they own the farm in fee simple pursuant to the 1967 deed 
from Arnold. The Siblings argue that the Grantees hold the farm 
in trust for the entire surviving family under a constructive 
trust theory. After a four-day trial exploring the circumstances 
of the 1967 deed, the district court agreed with the Siblings and 
imposed an equitable constructive trust on the Grantees in regard 
to the farm. 
BACKGROUND 
f3 Arnold acquired the farm from his mother in 1944. In 1966, 
Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold believed that he would 
be unable to obtain state-provided cancer treatment if he 
retained the farm in his name. This belief motivated Arnold to 
explore the possibility of transferring the farm to one of his 
sons as a means of getting it out of his name while still keeping 
it in the family. On March 24, 1967, Arnold conveyed the farm to 
the Grantees by warranty deed. Arnold's wife, Cleo, also signed 
the warranty deed although her name was not on the title to the 
farm. That same day, each of the Siblings signed quit-claim 
deeds transferring any interest they may have had in the farm to 
the Grantees. The Siblings contend that the transfer to the 
Grantees was always meant to be for their collective benefit as a 
family farm. 
1. Dwayne Rawlings's full name is Arnold Dwayne Rawlings, and 
LaRell Rawlings's full name is Theron LaRell Rawlings. We refer 
to them as Dwayne and LaRell to be consistent with references in 
the record and to differentiate between Dwayne Rawlings and his 
father, Arnold Rawlings. We also note that when we employ the 
term the Siblings as a descriptor of the beneficiaries of the 
purported trust in this case, the term includes all purported 
beneficiaries, including Grantees and Arnold and Cleo Rawlings. 
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1(4 After the transfer, Arnold and Cleo continued to live and 
work on the farm as if no transfer had occurred. When Arnold 
died in 1971, Cleo continued to live on the farm and family 
members worked the farm for her benefit. In 1974, the Grantees 
litigated a boundary dispute with the farm's southern neighbor. 
The Grantees' success in litigating the matter led to a 
settlement with several title companies, who paid the Grantees 
$52,000. The Grantees kept the bulk of that money but did 
distribute portions to Cleo and the Siblings. 
I 
f5 In 1978, the Grantees deeded one of the lots comprising the 
farm to themselves and Dwayne and Paulette in joint tenancy. 
About this same time, Donald and Dwayne began a business selling 
topsoil. In 1993, the Grantees asserted, allegedly for the first 
time, that they owned the farm free and clear and were not 
holding it in trust for the Siblings. This dispute over the 
nature of the Grantees' ownership interest in the farm led to the 
dissolution of Donald and Dwayne!s business, and the Grantees 
eventually sued Dwayne and Paulette. Dwayne and Paulette filed a 
counterclaim and self-described third-party complaint against the 
Grantees in their individual capacities and as trustees of an 
alleged trust, asserting a constructive trust over the farm 
property. The remainder of the Siblings joined in the 
counterclaim and third-party complaint. After extensive 
discovery, the district court bifurcated the parties' disputes 
and decided to first address the constructive trust issue. 
f6 Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to 
mediate their disputes. The Grantees informed the Siblings 
before mediation that they had no intent of considering any 
settlement of the matter. The Grantees appeared at the mediation 
session and told the mediator the same thing. The mediation 
session did not result in a settlement. Afterwards, the Siblings 
sought sanctions from the Grantees, alleging that they did not 
participate in mediation in good faith. The district court 
agreed, and ordered the Grantees to pay the Siblings $293 7 in 
expenses that the Siblings had incurred during the mediation 
process. 
H7 A four-day trial on the constructive trust issue commenced 
on March 12, 2 007. The bulk of the trial was comprised of the 
Siblings' testimony describing the circumstances of the 1967 
transfer and the family's treatment of the farm property after 
that date. Several of the Siblings testified to conversations 
that they had had with Arnold prior to the transfer, 
conversations that the Siblings interpreted as expressing an 
intent to place the farm in trust. The Grantees used the 
Siblings' testimony to explore issues regarding the Grantees' 
payment of debts owed by Arnold, which the Grantees argued 
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supported their position that Arnold intended to transfer the 
farm to them in fee simple. 
1f8 At the close of the Siblings' evidence, the Grantees moved 
for dismissal of the Siblings' constructive trust claims. The 
Grantees' motion and the Siblings' opposition to that motion 
relied on very different legal theories as to how the district 
court should evaluate the evidence at trial. The Grantees argued 
that the only way a constructive trust could have arisen in this 
case is if Arnold had attempted to create an express trust at the 
time of the transfer, but that express trust failed due to the 
lack of a writing evidencing the trust. Under the Grantees' 
theory, no trust was created unless Arnold intended to transfer 
the farm property into trust and Arnold and the Grantees were in 
a confidential relationship at the time of the transfer. The 
Siblings theory was much broader, asserting that the district 
court could simply employ its equitable powers to impose a 
constructive trust if it felt the circumstances warranted it. 
The district court requested written briefing from the parties on 
their respective positions and took the matter under advisement. 
The Grantees then presented their case, comprised solely of their 
own brief testimony, and the trial concluded. 
If9 Two months after trial, the district court ruled on the 
constructive trust issue. The district court expressly adopted 
the Siblings' argument that it could impose a trust relying 
solely on equitable principles and without regard to Arnold's 
intent or relationship to the Grantees at the time of transfer. 
The ruling recited an extensive factual summary of the testimony 
at trial, rejected the Grantees' alternative argument that the 
transfer was in consideration of them paying off a prior 
mortgage, and determined that Arnold had intended the conveyance 
solely as a mechanism to protect the family's ownership of the 
farm and did not intend the deed to operate as an actual transfer 
at all. The ruling concluded with the statement that the 
district court was "exercis[ing] its equitable powers to impose a 
constructive trust." In findings of fact prepared from the 
district court's ruling and later signed by the court, the court 
found as a factual matter that "Arnold did not consider the 
[1967] conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the 
[farm]." 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f10 On appeal from the district court's final order imposing an 
equitable constructive trust, the Grantees argue that the 
Siblings failed to present sufficient evidence in the district 
court to support the imposition of a trust under the 
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circumstances of this case.2 "'When an appellant is essentially 
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly 
erroneous standard of appellate review applies.1" Hi-Country 
Estates Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 2008 UT App 105, ^ 10, 
182 P.3d 417 (quoting Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares. 850 P.2d 487, 
489 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). However, we review a district court's 
decisions on questions of law, such as the legal requirements for 
the imposition of constructive trusts, for correctness. See, 
e.g., Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, f 8, 71 P.3d 589 ("The validity 
of [a] trust is an issue of law, which we review for 
correctness."). 
1fll The Grantees also argue that the district court erred when 
it imposed sanctions against the Grantees based on their alleged 
lack of good faith participation in court-ordered mediation. The 
proper interpretation of court rules presents an issue of law 
that we review for correctness. See, e.g., N.A.R., Inc. v. Farr, 
2000 UT App 62, f 5, 997 P.2d 343 ("'A trial court's 
interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration presents a question of law reviewed for 
correctness.'" (quoting Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT App 175, 
H 5, 982 P.2d 586)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. The District Court's Finding of an Equitable 
Constructive Trust 
fl2 The Grantees first challenge the evidentiary basis for the 
district court's imposition of an equitable constructive trust. 
Specifically, the Grantees argue that there is no evidence to 
support two elements that they assert must exist in order to 
impose a constructive trust in this case: (1) that a 
confidential relationship existed between Arnold and the Grantees 
at the time Arnold transferred the farm to the Grantees and 
(2) that Arnold intended to transfer ownership of the farm to the 
Grantees in trust for the Siblings. The Siblings counter that 
neither a confidential relationship nor any particular intent on 
the part of Arnold is a prerequisite to a court's imposition of a 
constructive trust on purely equitable principles. Thus, we 
first determine the proper legal analysis for the constructive 
trust issue and then turn to the question of whether the Grantees 
have identified an evidentiary barrier to the imposition of a 
trust in favor of the Siblings. 
2. The Grantees also raise a statute of limitations argument 
that we decline to address in light of our resolution of the case 
in the Grantees' favor on other grounds. 
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A. Trust Requirements 
Ul3 The Grantees and the Siblings present us, and presented the 
district court, with two conflicting theories for the proper 
analysis of this case. Confusingly, although the theories are 
conceptually quite different, they are both properly referred to 
as constructive trusts. The legal constructive trust theory 
urged by the Grantees allows for the enforcement; in certain 
circumstances, of an express trust that would otherwise be 
unenforceable. By contrast, the Siblings' equitable constructive 
trust approach does not enforce an otherwise unenforceable 
express trust, but rather creates and imposes a trust in equity 
to avoid the unjust enrichment of one who has committed some 
wrongful act. The district court accepted the Siblings1 theory 
of the case and ruled accordingly. We disagree, and hold that, 
because the Siblings' claim for relief ultimately relies on a 
purported unwritten express trust created by Arnold, the 
Grantees' theory is the proper approach under the circumstances 
of this case. 
fl4 The law relating to the creation and enforcement of express 
trusts is well settled and imposes various rules intended largely 
to protect the sanctity of property rights and the written 
instruments transferring those rights. See, e.g., Jewell v. 
Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961) (imposing clear 
and convincing evidence standard upon the attempted "overthrow of 
a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered"). An 
express trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to 
property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to 
create it and subjecting the person in whom title is vested to 
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others." 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added). 
Thus, when an express trust is claimed to have been created 
through an inter vivos transfer, the expressed intention of the 
grantor is perhaps the central element in the claim. 
fll5 Further, when no written instrument evidences a trust 
involving real property, the trust is enforceable only in limited 
circumstances. See id. (adopting section 45 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957) 
(stating circumstances under which an otherwise unenforceable 
express trust may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries). One 
circumstance under which an unwritten land trust may be enforced 
is when the grantor and grantee of the real property were, at the 
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time of the transfer, in a confidential relationship.6 Thus, the 
Grantees argue, a legal constructive trust may be imposed only 
upon evidence of Arnold's intent to create a trust as well as a 
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees. 
116 The Sibl ings argue, and the district court accepted, that an 
equitable constructive trust is an available remedy in this case. 
"Courts recognize a constructive trust as a matter of equity 
where there has been (1) a wrongful act, (2) unjust enrichment, 
and (3) specific property that can be traced to the wrongful 
behavior." Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, f 34, 164 P. 3d 
353. "Such trusts are usually imposed where injustice would 
result if a party were able to keep money or property that 
rightfully belonged to another." Id. "To establish a wrongful 
act under Utah law, an entity must have obviously received funds 
by mistake or participated in active or egregious misconduct." 
Id. fl 35; see, e.g., In Re Unicom Computer Corp., 13 F.3d 321, 
322 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a case where a creditor mistakenly 
transferred money to a debtor); Corporation of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, 24 
Utah 2d 187, 467 P.2d 984, 984 (1970) (involving a constructive 
trust that was placed on a third person after she was given a 
stolen automobile). 
fl7 The problem with the application of the Siblings' approach 
to the circumstances of this case is that the only wrongful act 
alleged by the Siblings is the Grantees' failure to comply with 
Arnold's expressed intentions at the time of the transfer. If 
Arnold did not have and express an intent that the 1967 deed 
transfer the farm property to the Grantees in trust, then the 
Grantees taking of the farm property in fee simple under the 
express language of the deed cannot be deemed wrongful. 
Conversely, in order for the Grantees' conduct to have been 
wrongful, Arnold would have needed to express his intent to 
transfer the farm property into trust--i.e., Arnold would have 
had to have attempted to create an express trust. Thus, the very 
circumstances that might entitle the Siblings to equitable relief 
trigger the application of the various legal rules governing the 
creation and enforcement of express trusts. 
1f 18 The Siblings seek to use the law of equitable constructive 
trusts as a substitute for the law governing the enforcement of 
express trusts. As well-intentioned as the district court's 
application of equitable principles in this case may have been, 
the practical effect of allowing the sort of equitable concerns 
3. The other circumstances described in section 45 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts have not been raised in this 
matter. 
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presented in this case to trump written deeds would be that "no 
person could longer rest in the security of his title to 
property, however solemn might be the instrument on which it was 
founded." Jewell, 366 P.2d at 598 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The law governing the enforcement of express trusts is 
clear and must be applied even when it produces results that, 
under a pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed 
inequitable. Cf. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 151 (holding that where an 
oral express trust exists, section 45 of the Restatement (Second) 
of Trusts is "controlling"). 
fl9 In sum, there are only two possible ways of characterizing 
the Grantees' actions in this case. They either acted in 
violation of Arnoldfs expressed intent, implicating the law of 
express trusts and their enforcement by constructive trust, or 
they committed no wrongful act at all. Either possibility is 
fatal to the imposition of a trust under the Siblings' equitable 
constructive trust theory, which is premised on avoiding unjust 
enrichment. We thus determine that the district court erred when 
it imposed a trust under the Siblings' theory. Although this 
determination necessitates our reversal of the district court's 
judgment in the Siblings' favor, questions remain as to whether 
the matter can be concluded in either party's favor as a matter 
of law or whether it must be remanded for further proceedings. 
To answer these questions, we turn to the Grantees1 evidentiary 
arguments. 
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
[^20 Having accepted the Grantees' application of the law of 
express trusts as the proper approach for evaluating this case, 
we examine the particular elements urged by the Grantees and the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support those elements. It is 
somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be asked to determine 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support findings that 
were not actually made by a trial court. Ordinarily, when the 
district court applies the wrong legal standard the matter is 
reversed and remanded so that the district court may consider the 
evidence under the proper standard. Here, however, the Grantees 
ask us to simply reverse the district court without remand, 
arguing that the evidence presented can only lead to a finding of 
no enforceable trust as a matter of law. 
f21 We agree with the Grantees that there is no enforceable 
unwritten express trust in this case, although we do so based on 
the district court's findings rather than on our own evaluation 
of the evidence presented below. After a four-day trial on the 
issue of Arnold's intent at the time of the 1967 deed, the 
district court made extensive factual findings about the 
circumstances surrounding Arnold's execution of the deed. One of 
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these findings was that "Arnold did not consider the conveyance 
to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the [farm]." 
[^22 This finding of Arnold's lack of intent is necessarily 
incompatible with the definition of an express trust, which 
requires the grantor's "manifestation of intent to create it.11 
See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987). An inter 
vivos trust can be created in these circumstances only by a 
grantor's intent to transfer property into trust. Cf. Legcrroan 
v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93, 232 P.2d 746, 748 
(1951) (n[T]he test for determining whether a writing has 
effected a trust or is testamentary in character is whether the 
maker intended the instrument to have any effect until after his 
death, or whether he intended to transfer some present interest. 
If, therefore, the father intended to pass legal title to the 
son, as trustee, . . . then the transaction was a valid trust." 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as 
found by the district court, Arnold did not intend to transfer 
the farm at all, and we can thus conclude only that he did not 
intend to transfer the farm into trust. Without Arnold's intent 
to transfer the farm into trust, there can be no express trust to 
enforce, directly or by imposition of a legal constructive trust, 
and the Grantees were entitled to judgment establishing their 
ownership of the farm under the express terms of Arnold's 
"clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered." See 
Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961).4 
f23 Under these circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that 
there can be no express trust in favor of the Siblings. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment on the 
trust issue and remand this matter for entry of judgment 
establishing fee simple ownership of the farm in the Grantees. 
II. The District Court's Sanctions Order 
[^24 The Grantees also challenge the district court's order 
imposing sanctions against them for failing to use good faith in 
participating in court-ordered mediation. We agree with the 
Grantees that such sanctions are inappropriate under the 
circumstances. 
f25 The Siblings sought sanctions against the Grantees after an 
unsuccessful court-ordered mediation session. According to the 
Siblings' motion in the district court, the Grantees informed the 
4. In light of the effect of the district court's finding that 
Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm, we need not address 
the question of whether the evidence could demonstrate a 
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees^ 
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Siblings prior to mediation that the Grantees did not want to 
participate in mediation and did not intend to make any proposals 
or consider any settlement offers in the mediation. The Siblings 
also asserted that " [a]t the June 27, 2006 mediation, [the 
Grantees] informed the mediator that they would neither make any 
offer nor consider any offer that he might present to them, and 
that they would refuse to attempt to resolve this case other than 
to let the matter go to trial." The district court found that 
the Grantees "came to the mediation with a fully formed intention 
not to participate in the mediation in good faith and had 
determined that they would not be prepared to discuss all 
relevant issues in this case" and awarded sanctions against the 
Grantees. 
\2S Mediation proceedings are governed by rule 101 of the Utah 
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. See Utah 
R. Ct. ADR 101. Rule 101(c) mandates that lf [a] 11 parties shall 
be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the 
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case." Id. 
R. 101(c). However, " [t]he parties may terminate the proceedings 
at any time." Id. R. 101(g). The rule further contemplates the 
circumstances under which sanctions may be imposed against a 
party: "Upon written recommendation by the mediator or motion by 
any party, the court may order absent parties to show cause why 
they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if 
appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed." Id. R. 101(h) 
(emphasis added). 
^27 Here, it is undisputed that the Grantees attended the 
mediation conference. However, the district court concluded that 
the Granteesf actions at and prior to the conference violated 
rule 101(c). Interpreting that rule, the district court stated 
that it "requires good faith discussion, and while parties may 
terminate that process, they may only do so after they have 
engaged in the settlement process in good faith." This 
interpretation is flatly contradicted by language elsewhere in 
the rule, which clearly states that "parties may terminate the 
proceedings at any time." See Utah R. Ct. ADR 101(g) (emphasis 
added). The rule also contemplates sanctions only when a party 
fails to attend a mediation conference, not when a party's 
actions at the conference fail to lead to a settlement. See id. 
R. 101(h); cf. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quashing sanctions order where the "basis 
for sanctions [was] merely that defendants were unwilling to make 
an offer of settlement satisfactory to [plaintiff]"). Finally, 
we disagree with the district court that the Grantees acted in 
bad faith or violated rule 101(c). It appears that they merely 
held a firm belief, vindicated by our decision today, in the 
validity of their claims such that they had no interest in a 
compromised settlement. Promptly informing the other parties and 
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the mediator of this fact served to avoid unnecessary time and 
resources spent in unproductive mediation efforts and cannot be 
viewed as evidence of bad faith under the circumstances so long-
as the Grantees otherwise complied with the terms of the rule. 
|^28 For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in 
sanctioning the Grantees for their actions at and leading up to 
the court-ordered mediation conference. Accordingly, we also 
reverse the order awarding sanctions and direct that all parties 
bear their own costs and fees arising from the failed mediation. 
CONCLUSION 
f29 We determine that the district court erred in finding that a 
purely equitable constructive trust can arise under the 
circumstances presented in this case. Rather, the only potential 
relief available to the Siblings is the enforcement, by means of 
a constructive trust, of an alleged unwritten express trust. We 
have determined, however, that an express trust can only exist in 
this case if Arnold intended to transfer the farm into trust and 
that the district court's finding that Arnold did not intend to 
transfer the farm at all precludes an express trust from arising 
in this case as a matter of law.6 Accordingly, we reverse the 
district court's judgment on the trust issue and remand this 
matter for entry of judgment in the Grantees' favor. 
1f3 0 We also reverse the district court's order awarding 
sanctions against the Grantees for failing to engage in good 
faith participation in court-ordered mediation. Rule 101 of the 
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution 
implicitly contemplates sanctions against parties solely for 
failing to appear at a mediation conference, and explicitly 
guarantees the rights of parties to terminate the proceedings at 
any time. For these reasons, we hold that the district court's 
5. We also note that our decision today is consistent with the 
high degree of confidentiality afforded to the mediation process. 
See, e.g., Reese v. Tingey Constr., 2008 UT 7, ^ 8, 177 P.3d 605 
(expressing the policy that mediation communications "be 
protected from postmediation disclosure"). 
6. To the extent that the district court's finding of Arnold's 
intent potentially affects the validity of the deed itself or 
requires further findings about the farm's ownership or chain of 
title, such matters exceed the scope of today's decision, and we 
express no opinion thereon. 
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imposition of sanctions against the Grantees was improper under 
the circumstances. 
K31 Reversed and remanded. 
y 
William A. Thome Jr., 
Associate Presiding Judge 
\Z2 WE CONCUR: 
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